Security model

Defaults we design for

• On-device authority. Agent homes, workspaces, journals, and transcripts live under the Twig root on the phone. The SQLite database is a rebuildable index, not the system of record.
• Keys stay local. Provider credentials are stored with the platform secure storage APIs available to the app. Twig is not your secret manager for the rest of life — treat device unlock and backups accordingly.
• Agent isolation. Each agent has a private home. User workspaces open only through grants that expire and are checked on open.
• Path sandbox. Workspace-relative paths are normalized and rejected if they escape (absolute paths, .., odd separators).
• Journal before mutate. Intent is appended and flushed before file changes so a crash leaves something reconcilable.
• Companion boundary. Declarative macros may run on the phone. Arbitrary scripts under scripts/ are for the laptop companion. That split is intentional.

What leaves the device

When you chat, prompt text, relevant recalled context, and attachments you send may go to the model provider you configured. Those providers process data undertheir terms and privacy policies. Twig does not replace those contracts.

Speech recognition and text-to-speech may use platform or vendor services depending on device configuration. Network access is required for remote models.

What we are not claiming

• Formal certification (SOC 2, ISO, etc.)
• Perfect resistance to a compromised device or unlocked backup
• That every Android OEM will honor background work equally
• That third-party model providers will retain or delete data on your schedule

Reporting

If you believe you have found a vulnerability in Twig itself, emailsecurity@bhalala.org with enough detail to reproduce. Please do not file public issues with exploit chains untilBhalala Corp has had a reasonable chance to respond.

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